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NOTE 
DID UNITED STATES V. HAYASHI FAIL TO 
PROVIDE A SAFE HARBOR FOR MARINE 
MAMMALS UNDER THE MARINE MAMMAL 
PROTECTION ACT? 
1. INTRODUCTION 
Dolphins, porpoises, whales, and other marine mammals 
have been exploited and their existence threatened due in 
large part to the practices of the fishing industry. 1 The boldest 
step that the American government has taken thus far to pro-
tect marine mammals is its enactment of the Marine Mammal 
Protection Act of 1972 (hereinafter "MMPA,,).2 Even with the 
enactment of the MMPA, marine mammals remain unprotect-
ed due to lack of enforcement and judicial interpretations that 
limit the scope of the MMPA. 
This note focuses on one such instance where a court erred 
in interpreting a key term in the MMPA. In United States v. 
Hayashi,3 the Ninth Circuit, sitting en bane, found that a fish-
1. When Congress enacted the Marine Mammal Protection Act dolphins and 
porpoises were endangered, as 250,000 porpoises were being slaughtered by the 
tUna industry each year. Laura L. Jones, Note, The Marine Mammal Protection 
Act and International Protection of Cetaceans, 22 VAND. J. 'rRANSNAT'L L. 997, 998-
99 (1989). In 1989, 300 dolphins each day were being killed by tuna fishers. Id. at 
999. 
2. David M. Levin, Towards Effective Cetacean Protection, 12 NAT. RESOURC-
ES L., 549, 571 (1979). 
The MMPA is codified at 16 U.S.C. §§ 1361-1421 (1994). 
3. United States v. Hayashi, 22 F.3d 859 (9th Cir. 1994) (rehearing en 
bane) (per Reinhardt, J., with whom Norris, J., joined; Browning, J., dissent-
ing). 
67 
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erman who shot at porpoises to deter them from his catch did 
not commit a "taking" under the MMPA.4 The court held that 
to constitute a criminal "taking" under the MMPA, harassment 
of a marine mammal must entail direct and serious disruptions 
of normal mammal behavior.5 This decision may result in fur-
ther exploitation and suffering of marine mammals. 
II. BACKGROUND OF THE MARINE MAMMAL PROTEC-
TION ACT 
The impact humans have upon marine mammals has 
"ranged from what might be termed malign neglect to virtual 
genocide."s Marine mammals have been "shot, blown up, 
clubbed to death, run down by boats, poisoned, and exposed to 
a multitude of other indignities, all in the interests of profit or 
recreation, with little or no consideration of the potential im-
pact of these activities on the animal populations involved."7 
One of humankind's most harmful impacts upon marine mam-
mals results as a consequence of tuna fishing with purse 
seines.s 
In response to these practices, Congress enacted the Ma-
rine Mammal Protection Act for the purpose of maintaining 
marine mammals at healthy population levels.9 The MMPA 
establishes that marine mammals, and the marine ecosystem 
4. Hayashi, 22 F.3d at 861. 
5. ld. at 864. 
6. H.R. REp. No. 707, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. (1971), reprinted in 1972 
U.S.C.C.A.N. 4144. 
7. ld. at 4144-45. 
8. Levin, supra note 2, at 551. Purse seine fishing is a procedure in 
which fishermen use dolphin to catch tuna. Because tuna associate with 
certain species of dolphin, fishermen look for dolphins to locate the tu-
na. Once spotted, fishermen herd dolphin and the tuna swimming beneath 
them into mile-long nets then close the nets around them. Once in the 
net, most dolphin panic and dive to the bottom where they get caught in 
the net webbing and drown. Elise Miller, Comment, The Fox Guarding the 
Henhouse: Conflicting Duties under the Marine Mammal Protection Act, 31 SANTA 
CLARA L. REV. 1063, 1065-66 (1990-91). When the MMPA was enacted, it was 
estimated that between 200 to 400 thousand porpoises are caught and 
killed in tuna nets each year. H.R. REP. No. 707, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. (1971), 
reprinted in 1972 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4144, 4148. 
9. H.R. REP. NO. 970, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. (1988), reprinted in 1988 
U.S.C.C.A.N. 6154, 6155. 
2
Golden Gate University Law Review, Vol. 27, Iss. 1 [1997], Art. 7
http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/ggulrev/vol27/iss1/7
1997] MARINE MAMMAL PROTECTION ACT 69 
upon which they depend for survival, require protection from 
human activities. 10 The MMPA covers all mammals who 
spend part of their lives in the sea. 11 The largest category of 
animals protected by this act is the Cetaceans, which includes 
whales, dolphins, and porpoises. 12 
In passing the MMPA, Congress recognized that "man's 
thumb is already on the balance of Nature," and decent treat-
ment for the marine mammals may well be in the long-term 
best interests of man. 13 To achieve this goal, the MMPA pro-
hibits the "taking" of any marine mammal by any person or 
vessel or other conveyance subject to the jurisdiction of the 
United States. 14 Under the MMPA, the term "take" is defined 
as "to harass, hunt, capture, or kill, or attempt to harass, hunt, 
capture, or kill any marine mammal. "15 The goal of the 
MMPA is to reduce such takings to insignificant levels and to 
greatly reduce the mortality and serious injury rate.16 
10. H.R. REP. No. 707, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. (1971), reprinted in 1972 
U.S.C.C.A.N. 4144, 4145. Congress found that "certain species and population 
stocks of marine mammal are, or may be, in danger of extinction or deple-
tion as a result of man's activities." 16 U.S.C. § 1361(1) (1994). 
11. [d. at 4148. 
12. Levin, supra note 2, at 553. Dolphin and porpoises are so similar 
physiologically, behaviorally and morphologically that the names are used 
interchangeably. [d. at 555. The names will therefore be used interchange-
ably throughout this note. 
13. H.R. REp. No. 707, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. (1971), reprinted in 1972 
U.S.C.C.A.N. 4144, 4145. 
14. 16 U.S.C. § 1372(a)(1) (1994). The MMPA also prohibits any person 
from possessing any marine mammal or marine mammal product, from trans-
porting, purchasing, selling, exporting, or from offering to purchase, selJ, 
or export any marine mammal or marine mammal product taken in violation 
of the Act. 16 U.S.C. § 1372(a)(3) & (4) (1994). 
15. 16 U.S.C. § 1362(13) (1994). 
16. 16 U.S.C. § 1371(a)(2) (1994). The 1981 Amendment to the MMPA pro-
vides that in the case of purse seine fishing for yellowfin tuna the goal 
of approaching a zero mortality and serious injury rate will be satisfied 
by "a continuation of the application of the best marine mammal safety 
techniques and equipment that are economically and technologically prac-
ticable." [d. 
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III. FACTS & PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
On January 24, 1991, David Hayashi, a part-time commer-
cial fisherman17 and life-time resident of Hawaii, was fishing 
for Ahi l8 off the coast of Waianae. 19 As he fished, a group of 
four porpoises began eating Ahi off his fishing lines.20 
Hayashi fired two rifle shots to the immediate rear of the ani-
mals in an attempt to deter the porpoises from his catch.21 
Neither of these shots struck the porpoises.22 
A state enforcement officer witnessed the shots fired by 
Hayashi and reported the incident to the National Marine 
Fisheries Service (hereinafter "NMFS,,).23 In February 1991, 
NMFS agents interviewed Hayashi and his son (who had been 
present on the boat when Hayashi fired at the porpoises) re-
garding the incidene4 and obtained their written state-
ments.25 A criminal information was subsequently filed, 
charging Hayashi with "knowingly taking a marine mammal" 
in violation of the MMP A. 26 
17. United States v. Hayashi, 22 F.3d 859, 861. The record does not 
specify whether Hayashi was engaged in commercial or recreational fish-
ing at the time of this incident. [d. at 859-67. 
18. [d. "Abi" means tuna in the Hawaiian language. WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW 
INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 44 (1976). 
19. Hayashi, 22 F.3d at 861. Waianae is off the coast of the Hawaiian 
island of Oahu. THE NEW YORK TIMES ATLAS OF THE WORLD 135 (3d ed. 1993). 
20. Hayashi, 22 F.3d at 861. The porpoises were approximately twenty-
five yards from the boat. Appellee's Answer 1,3rief at 2, U.S. v. Hayashi, 22 
F.3d 859 (9th Cir. 1994) (No. 91-10044). 
21. Hayashi, 22 F.3d at 861. 
22. [d. 
23. [d. Under the Marine Mammal Protection Act, the Department of 
Commerce is responsible for whales, dolphins, porpoises, sea lions and 
seals. Within the Department of Commerce, the National Oceanic and At-
mospheric Administration (hereinafter "NOAA") is responsible for the man-
agement and protection of marine mammals. NOAA's subordinate agency, 
the National Marine Fisheries Service, is assigned the responsibilities of 
research and management of whales, porpoises, dolphin and seals. H.R. REP. 
NO. 707, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. (1971), reprinted in 1972 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4144, 4146. 
24. Appellant's Opening Brief at 4, United States v. Hayashi, 22 F.3d 859 
(9th Cir. 1994) (No. 92-10044). 
25. Hayashi, 22 F.3d at 861. 
26. [d. Hayashi was charged under § 1371(a)(2)(A) of the MMPA. [d. This 
section of the statute provides that "it is unlawful. . . for any person or 
vessel or other conveyance to take any marine mammal in waters or on 
lands under the jurisdiction of the United States." 16 U.S.C. § 1372(a)(2)(A) 
4
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In July 1991, the state proceeded against Hayashi before a 
magistrate judge.27 Hayashi unsuccessfully sought dismissal 
of the charges on a theory that the MMPA, as applied, was un-
constitutionally vague.28 A trial ensued, based on the stipu-
lated facts received into the record.29 The magistrate judge 
convicted Hayashi of intentionally taking marine mammals, as 
prohibited by the MMPA, and sentenced him to one year of 
unsupervised probation, together with a $500 fine. 30 
Hayashi appealed to the United States District Court for 
the District of Hawaii, renewing the unconstitutional vague-
ness argument asserted in his motion to dismiss and raising a 
claim of insufficient evidence.31 The district court affirmed his 
conviction.32 Hayashi then brought an appeal before the Ninth 
Circuit Court of Appeals, asserting the same grounds present-
ed before the district court. 33The Ninth Circuit reversed the 
conviction, holding that there was insufficient evidence to find 
a criminal "taking" by "harassment" under the MMP A. 34 The 
court did not reach the issue of unconstitutional vagueness.35 
(1994). 
27. Hayashi, 22 F.3d at 861. 
28. [d. Specifically, Hayashi argued that the term "harass," as specified 
in the MMPA and as applied to porpoises, was unconstitutionally vague, 
thereby rendering the statute void. Appellant's Opening Brief at 5, United 
States v. Hayashi, 22 F.3d 859 (9th Cir. 1994) (No. 92·10044). 
29. Hayashi, 22 F.3d at 861. The facts submitted to the magistrate judge 
included the Hayashis' written statements and an NMFS agent's report and 
notes on the interviews of the father and son. [d. 
30. Appellant's Opening Brief at I, United States v. Hayashi, 22 F.3d 859 
(9th Cir. 1994) (No. 92·10044). A person who violates the Marine Mammal 
Protection Act may be assessed a civil or criminal penalty. 16 U.S.C. § 1375 
(1994). If a person violates any provision of the Act, or permit or regula-
tion issued thereunder, the Secretary may assess a civil penalty of up to 
$10,000 for each violation. 16 U.S.C. § 1375(a)(1) (1994). Further, the Secre-
tary may assess a criminal penalty to a person who knowingly violates the 
MMPA. 16 U.S.C. § 1375(b) (1994). Upon conviction, the criminal violator of 
the Act may be fined up to $20,000 for each violation, or imprisoned for 
up to one year, or both. [d. Each unlawful taking is a considered a sepa-
rate offense. 16 U.S.C. § 1375(a)(1) (1994). 
31. Hayashi, 22 F.3d at 861. 
32. [d. The district court did not hear oral argument. [d. 
33. [d. 
34. [d. at 865. 
35. Hayashi, 22 F.3d at 861 n.1. Although the Ninth Circuit did not 
reach Hayashi's vagueness challenge, it noted that the term "harass," as 
set forth in the MMPA, raises an issue of adequate notice to potential 
violators. [d. at 865 n.14. 
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N. COURT'S ANALYSIS 
A. MAJORITY OPINION 
[Vol. 27:67 
In United States v. Hayashi,36 the Ninth Circuit was 
asked to determine whether the defendant's act of intentionally 
shooting in the vicinity of porpoises in an attempt to deter 
them from eating Ahi off of his fishing line fell within the 
MMPA's proscription against the "taking" of marine mam-
mals.37 The Ninth Circuit, in its majority opinion, held that 
the district court, which had affirmed a magistrate judge's 
conviction of the defendant, committed two errors.3S First, the 
actus reus, or criminal act itself, was improperly defined be-
cause the court had relied upon an improper statute to formu-
late its definition of "take" under the act.39 Second, the mens 
rea, or the mental element for the crime charged, was not 
properly limited to conduct which was knowing and intention-
al.40 Mter setting forth and explaining the errors below, the 
court went on to determine that there was insufficient evidence 
to convict Hayashi of "knowingly taking" a marine mammal in 
violation of the MMPA.41 Thus, the Ninth Circuit reversed 
Hayashi's conviction.42 . 
36. United States v. Hayashi, 22 F.3d 859 (9th Cir. 1994). 
37. Id. at 861. 
38. Id. at 862. 
39. Id. 
40. Id. The district court had affirmed Hayashi's conviction under the 
erroneous belief that negligent conduct was sufficient to support crimi-
nal prosecution of Hayashi under the MMPA. While the MMPA authorizes 
both civil and criminal penalties for violation of its provisions, criminal 
penalties only apply to persons who "knowingly" violate a provision of the 
act. In the proceedings below, the parties referred the court to 50 C.F.R. 
§ 17.3, which includes both negligent and intentional acts in its definition 
of "harass." In so doing, they failed to inform the court that the MMPA 
requires the defendant to "knowingly" commit the prohibited conduct be-
fore criminal liability may attach. The district court's affirmance of 
Hayashi's conviction rested at least in part upon its misunderstanding of 
the requisite mens rea. While the district court found that "[f]iring the 
rifle in waters containing porpoises was a negligent act that created a 
likelihood of ir\iury to the porpoises" they went on to suggest that there 
was also evidence of Hayashi's intentional attempt to deter the porpoises 
from his catch. Hayashi, 22 F.3d at 862. 
41. Id. at 865. 
42. Id. at 861. 
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1. Statutory Interpretation: Defining the Actus Reus 
To correctly define the actus reus the Ninth Circuit looked 
first to the statute under which Hayashi had been charged, 16 
U.S.C. § 1372(a)(2)(A).43 This statute prohibits the "taking" of 
a marine mammal in United States waters.44 Noting that the 
MMPA defines "take" as "to harass, hunt, capture, or kill or 
attempt to harass, hunt, capture, or kill,,,45 the court deter-
mined that only the terms "harass" and "attempt to harass" 
were potentially applicable to Hayashi's conduct.46 At the time 
Hayashi committed the act of firing at the porpoises, the term 
"harass" was not further defined within the MMPA or its com-
panion administrative regulations.47 Nevertheless, regulations 
issued under the Endangered Species Act defining "take" with 
regard to porpoises were available and utilized by the Ninth 
Circuit.46 These regulations state that the intentional or negli-
gent "disturbing" or "molesting" of a marine mammal consti-
tutes a "take.,,49 However, the Ninth Circuit Court found 
these examples of "taking" to be equally vague, and determined 
that a clearer definition of "taking" by "harassment" was to be 
ascertained by referring to the context of the statute. 50 
43. [d. at 861. 
44. 16 U.S.C. § 1371(a)(2)(A) (1994). See supra note 26. 
45. 16 U.S.C. § 1362(13) (1994). 
46. Hayashi, 22 F.3d at 861. The government conceded that no other 
terms within the definition of "take" had possible application to Hayashi's 
act of firing shots within the vicinity of porpoises while they were eating 
fish and bait from his fishing lines. [d. 
47. [d. 
48. [d. at 863-64 (citing 50 C.F.R. § 216.3 (1994». 50 C.F.R. § 216.3 defines 
"take" as to 
harass, hunt, capture, collect, kill, or attempt to 
harass, hunt, capture, collect or kill any marine 
mammal. This includes, without limitation, any of 
the following: The collection of dead animals, or 
parts thereof; the restraint or detention of a ma-
rine mammal, no matter how temporary; tagging a 
marine mammal; the negligent or intentional opera-
tion of an aircraft or vessel, or the doing of any 
other negligent or intentional act which results in 
disturbing or molesting a marine mammal; and feed-
ing or attempting to feed a marine mammal in the 
wild. 
50 C.F.R. § 216.3 (1996). 
49. Hayashi, 22 F.3d at 864. 
50. [d. 
7
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The term "harass," the court noted, is grouped with "hunt," 
"capture," and "kill" as forms of prohibited "taking."Sl Relying 
on the principle that words which are grouped together in a 
list should be given similar meaning,S2 the court determined 
that each of these terms "involve[d] direct and significant in-
trusions upon the normal, life-sustaining activities of a marine 
mammal."S3 Therefore, the Ninth Circuit concluded that simi-
lar to those terms, "harass" must involve a similar level of 
intrusion.s4 
As additional support for this conclusion, the court next 
looked to the very regulation, 50 C.F.R. § 17.3, which it deter-
mined the magistrate judge and district court had improperly 
relied upon in formulating their definition of "take."s5 The 
court postulated that although § 17.3 implements the Endan-
gered Species Act, a statute distinct and separate from the 
MMPA, the regulations could nevertheless prove to be useful 
as analogous authority to aid in interpreting the terms from 
the MMPA.56 
Section 17.3 defines "harassment" which constitutes a 
"taking" to require a significant disruption of "normal behav-
ioral patterns" including breeding, feeding or sheltering.s7 The 
51. [d. 16 U.S.C. § 1362(13) (1994). 
52. The doctrine of noscitur a sociis, a familiar principle of statutory 
construction, states that if a meaning of a statute is unclear, the mean-
ing of doubtful words may be determined by reference to their relation-
ship with other associated words and phrases. NORMAN SINGER, SUTHERLAND 
STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 47.16, at 183 (5th ed. 1992). 
53. Hayashi, 22 F.3d at 864. 
54. [d. 
55. [d. 
56. [d. The court noted, "section 17.3, issued under the Endangered 
Species Act, is not the controlling regulatory definition and is an improp-
er starting point for any MMPA prosecution; it is nonetheless analogous 
authority that is of considerable assistance in interpreting 50 C.F.R. § 
216.3." [d. Furthermore, the NMFS has itself referred to § 17.3 in inter-
preting the meaning of "harass" under the MMPA. [d. at 864 n.13. 
57. Hayashi, 22 F.3d at 864. The text of 50 C.F.R. § 17.3 defining harm 
states 
Harm in the definition of "take" . .. means an act 
which actually kills or injuries wildlife. Such act 
may include significant habitat modification or deg-
radation where it actually kills or injures wildlife 
by significantly impairing essential behavioral pat-
8
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court noted that this definition emphasized protecting "natu-
ral" animal behavior, not abnormal marine mammal activi-
ty.58 This definition, the court held, was consistent with the 
essence of the MMPA which strove to preserve marine mam-
mals as essential components of the "natural" marine ecosys-
. tern. 59 The court found that § 17.3 did not support an inter-
pretation of "harassment" which prohibits disturbing marine 
mammals who are endangering human life or property.60 
Thus the interpretation of "harass" propounded by the court 
would look at the act of the alleged harasser and also consider 
the act in which the marine mammal was engaged.61 A "tak-
ing" by "harassment," according to the majority of the Ninth 
Circuit, encompassed "only direct and serious disruptions of 
normal mammal behavior."62 
2. Application of the Court's Definition of the Actus Reus to 
the Conduct Underlying Hayashi's Conviction 
The Ninth Circuit's definition of the actus reus limited 
criminal conduct to "direct and serious disruptions of normal 
mammal behavior."63 In reviewing the conduct of Hayashi, the 
court bifurcated its analysis, looking first at whether the mam-
mals at issue had been disrupted from "normal" behavior, and 
subsequently at the reasonableness of Hayashi's conduct. 54 
terns, including breeding, feeding or 8heltering. 
50 C.F.R. § 17.3 (1996). 
58. Hayashi, 22 F.3d at 864. 
59. [d. 
60. [d. at 865. 
61. [d. 
62. [d. at 865. The court suggested that the lower courts had given 
the term "harass" too broad a definition, and "in the absence of [their] 
appropriately restrictive construction of the MMPA and its regulations, 
'harass' would raise a serious issue of adequate notice to potential viola-
tors." [d. at 865 n.14. 
63. [d. at 865. 
64. 1d. 
9
Fisher and Bell: Marine Mammal Protection Act
Published by GGU Law Digital Commons, 1997
76 GOLDEN GATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 27:67 
a. The Requirement that "Normal" Behavior Patterns Be 
Disrupted 
At the moment Hayashi fired shots at the porpoises, the 
animals were eating bait and hooked fish from his fishing 
lines.55 Eating fish and bait off a fisherman's lines, the ma-
jority asserted, was "not a part of the porpoise's normal eating 
habits."56 Furthermore, no evidence was presented establish-
ing that the animals had in fact been deterred from the lines 
or even reacted to Hayashi's shots.67 Thus, the Ninth Circuit 
concluded that the evidence failed to establish that Hayashi's 
shots had deterred the porpoises from "normal" behavior pat-
terns.58 
b. The Requirement of a "Direct and Serious" Disruption 
With regard to the requirement that the defendant's con-
duct result in a direct and serious disruption, the court sum-
marily stated that "Hayashi's conduct was not the kind of 
direct, serious disruption of a porpoise's customary pursuits 
required to find a criminal 'taking.' Reasonable acts to deter 
porpoises from eating fish or bait off a fisherman's line are not 
~riminal under the MMP A. ,,59 
Thus, having found that there was no "direct and serious 
disruption of normal mammal behavior," the Ninth Circuit 
concluded that the MMPA and the regulations implementing 
the Act failed to reach Hayashi's conduct. 70 
65. [d. 
66. [d. 
67. Hayashi, 22 F.3d at 865. The majority noted, however, that any di-
version from eating off Hayashi's lines was not required to constitute a 
"taking" under the MMPA. [d. 
68. [d. 
69. [d. The court emphasized in a footnote that the reasonableness of 
deterrent steps depends upon their impact on the mammal. [d. at 865 n.15. 
70. Hayashi, 22 F.3d at 865. 
10
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3. Squaring the Court's Interpretation with Subsequent Reg-
ulations Proscribing the Feeding of Marine Mammals 
Subsequent to the incident for which Hayashi was prose-
cuted, the NMFS promulgated regulations adding "feeding or 
attempting to feed" to the definition of "harass" found in 50 
C.F.R. § 216.3.71 This amendment to the definition of "harass" 
addressed concerns that people feeding marine mammals dis-
rupts their natural feeding patterns, potentially conditioning 
them to approach watercraft, and thereby increasing the likeli-
hood "that they will become entangled in fishing gear, be 
struck by vessels, or be shot, poisoned, or fed foreign ob-
jects."72 The court determined that this amendment deterred 
precisely that behavior which Hayashi had himself deterred by 
firing the rifle shots.73 The court concluded that were it to 
hold that Hayashi's behavior constituted ''harassment,'' then 
under the new regulations, a fisherman would be guilty of 
"harassment" by "feeding" if he did not deter a marine mam-
mal from feeding off of his fishing lines.74 But at the same 
time, a fisherman would be guilty of "harassment" by "disturb-
ing" if he took steps to deter such acts.75 For these reasons, 
the court concluded, the new regulation supported their defini-
tion of ''harass'' as well as their interpretation that the MMPA 
did not reach Hayashi's conduct.76 
B. DISSENT 
Judge Browning dissented from the analysis and conclu-
sions of the majority, finding that they represented both bad 
71. Id. (referring to 56 Fed. Reg. 11693 (1991) which became effective 
April 19, 1991). 
72. Id. at 866 (citing 56 Fed. Reg. 11693, 11695 (1991». 
73. Hayashi, 22 F.3d at 866. 
74.Id. 
75. Id. However, the dissent argues that the majority presented a false 
"fisherman's dilemma." Judge Browning asserts 50 C.F.R. § 216.3 only regu-
lates "intentional" feeding of marine mammals, and exempts unintentional, 
incidental feeding. Since the fisherman would be fishing for tuna for 
human consumption, not to feed to the porpoises, Browning argues that 
this provision would not apply to the conduct because the feeding of the 
porpoises would be unintentional. Id. at 869 n.6. 
76. Id. at 866. 
11
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law and bad policy.77 He stated that the goal of the Marine 
Mammal Protection Act is the "optimal protection" of marine 
mammals from human activities which threaten their surviv-
a1.78 Thus, he would not limit the scope of the MMPA to hu-
man activity which results in the certain physical destruction 
or injury of marine mammals.79 Rather, Judge Browning 
found the MMPA expressed a sweeping statement of public 
policy and was intended by Congress to regulate a wide variety 
of human activity, including those activities which create the 
"mere potential" for harm.8o In Browning's view, "taking" un-
der the MMPA encompassed Hayashi's act of intentionally 
firing rifle shots into the water near porpoises which were 
feeding from bait and tuna hooked on fishing lines.81 Brown-
ing would affirm Hayashi's conviction.82 
1. A Broad Definition of "Take" is Necessary to Effect Con-
. gressional Intent 
Judge Browning argued that Congress intended "taking" to 
be broadly defined.83 He claimed that as a key jurisdictional 
term within the act, its "cramped" construction would "restrict 
most aspects of the scheme envisioned by Congress for the 
protection of marine mammals.,,84 
Browning pointed out that the MMPA's substantive provi-
sions commence with an absolute moratorium on the "taking" 
of marine mammals.8s The Secretary is delegated the authori-
ty to regulate both public and private conduct falling within 
77. Hayashi, 22 F.3d at 871. 
78. [d. at 867 (citing to 1972 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 4148). 
79. [d. 
80. [d. The adopted legislation was constructed with conservation in 
mind. The Committee on Merchant Marine and Fisheries indicated that the 
"legislation should be adopted to require that we act conservatively.. .. 
[N]o steps should be taken regarding [endangered marine mammals] that 
might prove to be adverse or even irreversible in their effects until more 
is known." H.R. REP. No. 707, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. (1971), reprinted in 1972 
U.S.C.C.A.N. 4144, 4148. 
81. Hayashi, 22 F.3d at 867. 
82. [d. at 866. 
83. [d. at 867. 
84. [d. 
85. [d. See 16 U.S.C. § 1371(a) (1984). 
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this moratorium; his power is confined by the meaning as-
signed to the term.86 
When "take" is read restrictively, as it is under the 
majority's formulation, the scope of activities encompassed 
within the Act's prohibitions is limited, as is the Secretary's 
power to protect endangered marine mammals.87 Judge 
Browning asserted that such a construction would be inconsis-
tent with Congress's stated intent to provide "optimal" marine 
mammal protection.88 On the other hand, Browning coun-
tered, a broad definition of "take" allows the necessary flexibili-
ty for effective administration and is consistent with 
protections envisioned by Congress.89 
2. The Statutory Language, Legislative History, and 
Secretary's Determinations Support the Broad Interpretation 
of "Taking" by "Harassment" under which Hayashi's Conduct 
Is Proscribed 
Judge Browning next looked to the MMPA, its companion 
regulations, and the Secretary's interpretation of the term 
"taking.,,90 He concluded that these sources supported an in-
terpretation of "take" sufficiently broad to encompass 
Hayashi's conduct.91 
Noting, as had the majority, that "take" is defined by the 
terms "harass" "hunt" "capture" and "kill" Browning deter-, , , , 
86. Hayashi, 22 F.3d at 866-67. The Secretary may prohibit conduct 
which is harmful to the marine mammals as well as develop and encourage 
means of ensuring their survival. The areas that will be affected by the 
majority's narrow construction of the term "taking" include the 
Secretary's research into methods of fishing that minimize the incidental 
"taking" of marine mammals (16 U.S.C. §§ 1380-1381), the reported incidental 
"takings" by vessels that have received exemptions to provide information 
on the effect of fishing techniques on marine mammals (16 U.S.C. § 
1383a(c),(g», and the Marine Mammal Commission's continuing review of 
humane means of "taking" marine mammals (16 U.S.C. § 1402(a)(2». [d. "Secre-
tary" refers to the Secretary of Interior and the Secretary of Commerce. 
[d. at 866 n.1. 
87. [d. 
88. [d. at 867. 
89. Hayashi, 22 F.3d at 867. 
90. [d. at 867-69. 
91. [d. at 867. 
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mined that Congress had intended to regulate human contact 
with marine mammals, "progressing in severity" from mere 
"harassment" to the ultimate destruction, the "killing" of the 
mammal.92 "Harass," he found, was not intended to be sub-
merged into a singular meaning encompassing the whole of the 
statutory phrase.93 It must, he concluded, be read to broaden 
the definition of "taking" and the scope of the Act itself.94 
In support of this conclusion, Judge Browning noted that 
Congress had previously identified the "intentional pursuit of 
marine mammals" and the use of "acoustic deterrent devices" 
as "takings" by "harassment" proscribed by the Act.95 Further-
more, turning to 50 C.F.R. § 216.3, Judge Browning cited regu-
latory examples of "taking," including the mere restraint or 
tagging of a marine mammal. He found these to be inconsis-
tent with the majority's assertion that "harassment" contem-
plates only "direct and significant intrusions" upon "normal" 
mammal behavior.96 
Finally, Judge Browning reviewed exemptions and excep-
tions to the Act's broad proscriptions.97 He concluded that the 
parties involved in enactment and administration of the Act, as 
well as the parties governed by the Act, viewed "taking" as a 
broad concept, one broad enough, he asserted, to encompass 
92. [d. 
93. [d. 
94. Hayashi, 22 F.3d at 868. Judge Browning's conclusion that "harass" 
must significantly add to the definition of take is premised at least in 
part upon the fact that Congress had rejected a proposal to define "take" 
in terms which differed only in the absence of "harass" and inclusion of 
"wound." [d. 
95. [d. 
96. [d. at 869. Judge Browning was concerned not only with the 
majority's narrowing of the definition of "taking" here, but also with the 
"elusive concept" of "normal marine mammal behavior," which is not men-
tioned in the Act or its legislative history and will require courts and 
regulators to develop a system of rules from which to determine exactly 
what behavior the majority is referring to. In addition, Judge Browning 
challenged the majority's suggestion that a porpoise's feeding off of fish-
ing lines constituted "unnatural" or "abnormal" behavior. He argued that 
by excluding such behavior from the protections of the MMPA the majori-
ty denied marine mammals protection from harm arising out of human fish-
ing activity, a primary purpose of the Act. [d. at 868-69. 
97. Hayashi, 22 F.3d at 868. 
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the conduct of Hayashi and support his criminal conviction.98 
Noting that the Secretary's authority includes discretion-
ary approval of permit applications which include "takings" 
otherwise prohibited by the Act, Browning observed that per-
mits were regularly requested and granted, authorizing con-
duct "no more intrusive" than photographic identification, 
vessel approach, and the broadcast of underwater acoustic 
recordings.99 Apparently, he concluded, the Secretary and the 
fishermen subject to this legislation considered such conduct to 
be within the Act's broad proscriptions. lOo 
Judge Browning also identified an exemption for commer-
cial fishermen, allowing them to register with the Secretary for 
permission to intentionally "take" marine mammals in order to 
protect their catch, gear, or persons during the course of com-
mercial fishing operations. 101 This exemption, he asserted, 
could only exist if such conduct were prohibited by the Act. 102 
Browning argued that on its face, this exemption established 
that Hayashi's act of firing a rifle to scare away scavenging 
dolphins to defend his fishing catch fell within the MMPA's 
proscriptions. 103 
V. CRITIQUE 
The majority erred by narrowly defining ''harassment'' 
under the MMPA to include only those acts which directly and 
seriously disrupt normal marine mammal behavior. 104 The 
contention that ''harass'' should be more broadly interpreted is 
supported by clear statutory language, the legislative history of 
98. [d. at 869. 
99. [d. at 868. 
100. [d. 
101. [d. at 870. Judge Browning noted that some loss of marine mammal 
life was inevitable in commercial tuna fishing operations. To protect this 
industry, the Congressional exemption provides a "restraining system of 
permits and regulations administered by the Secretary" which limits injury 
to the animals without destroying commercial fishing enterprises. Hayashi, 
22 F.3d at 870. 
102. [d. 
103. [d. 
104. United States v. Hayashi, 22 F.3d 859, 866 (9th Cir. 1994) (Browning, 
J., dissenting). 
15
Fisher and Bell: Marine Mammal Protection Act
Published by GGU Law Digital Commons, 1997
82 GOLDEN GATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 27:67 
the MMPA, and the Secretary's regulations enforcing and in-
terpreting the Act.lo5 Furthermore, the majority erroneously 
employed the doctrine of noscitur a sociis when defining the 
term "harass." Consequently, the majority failed to give effect 
to the expressed intent of Congress by not giving "harass" its 
independent meaning as Congress intended. lOG 
A THE PLAIN MEANING OF "HARASS" SUPPORTS THE 
CONTENTION THAT SHOOTING AT PORPOISES CONSTITUTES A 
"TAKING" UNDER THE MMPA 
The starting point in statutory interpretation is to look at 
the plain language of the statute. I07 As the MMPA defines 
the term "take" to include the harassment of marine mammals, 
it is appropriate to look at the plain meaning of the term "ha-
rass" to determine its meaning under the MMPA 108 One way 
to determine the plain meaning of a word is to look at the 
dictionary.l09 Webster's New Collegiate Dictionary defines 
"harass" as "to worry or impede by repeated raids" or "to annoy 
persistently."11o 
Hayashi's firing two successive rifle shots at porpoises fits 
within the common definition of "harass."lll Porpoises, as 
highly intelligent mammals, would feel worried or annoyed 
when in the close vicinity of rifle shots. 112 Thus, as Congress 
included "harassment" as a prohibited form of "taking'Hl3 and 
as Hayashi's actions toward the porpoises clearly fall within 
105. See infra parts V.A., V.B., and V.C. 
106. SINGER, supra note 52, § 46.03, at 94. "The courts owe fidelity to the 
will of the legislature. What the legislature says in the text of the stat-
ute is considered the best evidence of the legislative intent or will. 
Therefore, the courts are bound to give effect to the expressed intent of 
the legislature." [d. 
107. Gwaltney of Smithfield, Ltd. v. Chesapeake Bay Found., Inc., 484 
U.S. 49, 56 (1987) (citing Consumer Product Safety Comm'n v. GTE Sylvania, 
Inc., 447 U.S. 102, 108 (1980». See Washington Pub. Interest Research Group 
v. Pendleton Woolen Mills, 11 F.3d 883, 885-86 (9th Cir. 1993). 
108. 16 U.S.C. § 1362(13) (1994). 
109. Babbitt v. Sweet Home Chapter of Communities For A Great Oregon, 
115 S. Ct. 2407, 2412 (1995). 
110. WEBSTER'S NEW COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 517 (1980). 
111. See infra text accompanying notes 112-114. 
112. See infra notes 125-130 and accompanying text. 
113. See supra note 15 and accompanying text. 
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the plain meaning of harassment, Hayashi's conduct violated 
the MMP A. 114 
B. THE LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE MMPA SUPPORTS THE 
CONTENTION THAT HAYASHI'S ACTIONS CONSTITUTED A "TAKE" 
UNDER THE MMPA 
A broad definition of "harass" is supported by the legisla-
tive history of the Marine Mammal Protection Act. 115 In the 
MMPA, Congress broadly defined "take" as "including harass-
ing, hunting, capturing or killing any marine mammal or at-
tempting to do SO.,,116 The term harass was included to broad-
en the scope of protections afforded to marine mammals, there-
by ensuring the effectiveness of the MMPA. l17 This is evi-
denced by Congress's statement: "The definition of taking ... 
includes the concept of harassment, and it is intended that this 
term be construed sufficiently broadly . .. .'>118 
Additional examples of "taking" recognized by Congress in 
the legislative history also support the contention that the 
term "harass" is to be broadly defined. 119 Congress identified 
the "intentional pursuit" of a marine mammal, the "use of 
acoustic deterrence devices," and the "operation of motor boats" 
as examples that would "clearly constitute harassment."12o It 
is hard to reconcile how use of an acoustic deterrence device 
114. See supra, text accompanying notes 111-113. 
115. See infra notes 116-121 and accompanying text. The Supreme Court 
often uses legislative history to assist in statutory interpretation. See 
Babbitt v. Sweet Home Chapter of Communities For a Great Oregon, 115 S. 
Ct. 2407 (1995); Gwaltney of Smithfield, Ltd. v. Chesapeake Bay Found., 
Inc., 484 U.S. 49 (1987). 
116. 16 U.S.C. § 1362(13) (1994); H.R. REp. No. 707, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 
(1971), reprinted in 1972 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4144, 4155. 
117. Hayashi, 22 F.3d at 867 (Browning, J., dissenting). 
118. Hayashi, 22 F.3d at 867 (Browning, J., dissenting) (quoting H.R. REp. 
No. 707, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. (1971), reprinted in 1972 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4144, 4150) 
(emphasis added). Further, arguing that the definition of "take" was too 
broad, the Commerce Department proposed an alternative definition that 
purposefully omitted the term "harass." Congress however, rejected this 
proposal. [d. at 868. 
119. [d. 
120. H.R. REP. No. 707, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. (1971), reprinted in 1972 
U.S.C.C.A.N. 4144, 4155; H.R. REP. No. 970, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. (1988), re-
printed in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6154, 6164. 
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"clearly constitutes harassment" yet, firing rifle shots in the 
vicinity where porpoises are swimming does not. 
Congress' intent that "harass" be "construed sufficiently 
broadly" and the examples of actions that constitute harass-
ment establish that Hayashi's act of shooting at the porpoises 
clearly falls within Congress' intended definition of "harass-
ment" and thus, is a "taking" under the MMP A. This interpre-
tation of "harass" is consistent with Congress' desire that "por-
poises be given every reasonable protection."121 
C. REGULATIONS DEFINE "TAKE" BROADLY TO INCLUDE ACTS 
THAT DISTURB OR MOLEST MARINE MAMMALS - FIRING AT 
PORPOISES SHOULD CONSTITUTE A "TAKE" UNDER THE MMPA 
The regulations issued by the National Marine Fisheries 
Service that are applicable to the MMPA122 offer additional 
support to the contention that Hayashi's violent acts toward 
the porpoises violated the MMPA.123 Although these regula-
tions do not define the term "harass," the regulations do define 
"take," at 50 C.F.R. § 216.3, to include "the doing of any other 
negligent or intentional act which results in disturbing or 
molesting a marine mammal."124 
Studies on the cerebral cortex of Cetaceans show that 
porpoises are highly intelligent mammals. 125 The functions of 
the brain associated with "intelligence" are controlled within 
the cerebral cortex.126 A high degree of convolution of the ce-
rebral cortex connotes a high degree of cerebral function-
ing.127 Studies reveal that the cerebral cortex of all Cetaceans 
121. H.R. REp. No. 707, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. (1971), reprinted in 1972 
U.S.C.C.A.N. 4144, 4148. 
122. See, e.g., 50 C.F.R. § 216 (1996). 
123. See infra notes 124·34 and accompanying text. 
124. 50 C.F.R. § 216.3 (1995). See supra note 48. 
125. Levin, supra note 2, at 557. 
126. [d. The cerebral cortex is responsible for recording the changes in 
the external and internal environments, evaluating the environment on 
the basis of needs and experiences, and initiating motor activity to reo 
spond to the internal and external environments, as well as thinking, 
memory, and language. [d. 
127. [d. A high degree of convolution of the cerebral cortex increases 
the surface area of the cortex. [d. 
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is more convoluted than a human's.128 Thus, if cortically me-
diated behavior is an adequate measure of intelligence, the 
similarity between the human cortex and the Cetacean cortex 
is indicative of high Cetacean intelligence. 129 Therefore, just 
as a human would be "disturbed" or feel "molested" if shot at, 
the porpoises swimming in the vicinity of Hayashi's shots 
would also feel disturbed and molested.130 Since he disturbed 
the porpoises, Hayashi's actions fell within the regulatory 
definition of "take," thereby violating the MMPA. 
The regulations in 50 C.F.R. § 216.3 also call into question 
the majority's holding that "harassment" must entail a "direct 
and significant intrusion . . . upon the normal, life-sustaining 
activities of a marine mammaL"131 However, the Code of Fed-
eral Regulations § 216.3 states that a detention "no matter 
how temporary" constitutes a "taking" under the MMPA. 132 
The term "no matter how temporary" does not indicate a "di-
rect and significant intrusion." Further, the majority's asser-
tion that "harassment" must entail an intrusion upon a "life-
sustaining activity"133 is in direct conflict with 50 C.F.R. § 
216.3, which states that the "collection of a dead animal" con-
stitutes a "taking" under the MMPA.134 By limiting "harass-
ment" to activities that result in a "direct and significant intru-
sion upon the normal, life-sustaining activities," the majority 
ignored the broad meaning given to "take" by the administra-
tive regulations implementing and interpreting the MMPA. 
128. Levin, supra note 2, at 557. 
129. [d. at 558. 
130. As the cerebral functions include thinking, as well as recording 
changes in, evaluating, and adjusting motor activity to respond to the 
internal and external environments, see Levin, supra note 2, we may infer 
that highly intelligent cetaceans are disturbed by acts of violence direct-
ed toward them, such as Hayashi's conduct of shooting a rifle in their 
direction. 
131. Hayashi, 22 F.3d at 868 (Browning, J., dissenting). 
132. 50 C.F.R. § 216.3 (1996). 
133. Hayashi, 22 F.2d at 866. 
134. See 50 C.F.R. § 216.3 (1996). 
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D. A BROAD INTERPRETATION OF "HARAss" IS SUPPORTED BY 
THE PERMITS ISSUED BY THE SECRETARY UNDER THE MMPA 
As noted by Justice Browning in his dissent, the broad 
scope of "taking" is evidenced by the permits issued to allow 
conduct no more intrusive than Hayashi's shooting in the vi-
cinity of porpoises. ls5 The MMPA prohibits all taking of ma-
rine mammals with specified exceptions. ISS Under the 
MMPA, the Secretary's authority includes discretionary ap-
proval of permit applications, authorizing conduct that consti-
tutes "harassment."137 Exercising this power, the Secretary 
issued permits authorizing "vessel approach, helicopter 
photogrammetry and photographic identification."138 It is 
hard to reconcile how these activities have a "direct and signif-
icant" impact upon marine mammals, but firing rifle shots 
near porpoises would not. 
E. THE NINTH CIRCUIT ERRED IN EMPLOYING THE DOCTRINE 
OF NOSCITUR A SOCIIS TO DETERMINE THE MEANING OF 
"HARAss" UNDER THE MMPA 
By applying the doctrine of noscitur a sociis,139 the Ninth 
Circuit narrowly interpreted the term "harass" under the 
MMPA. I40 The Ninth Circuit erred by employing this doctrine 
for two reasons. First, the doctrine is employed only when the 
legislative intent or meaning of the statute is unclear. 141 
However, the legislative intent of including "harassment" as a 
form of "take" is not unclear or ambiguous. 142 Congress stat-
135. Hayashi, 22 F.3d at 868 (Browning, J., dissenting). 
136. ld. 
137. 16 U.S.C. § 1371(a)(3)(A) (1994). Section 1371(a)(3)(A) states in relevant 
part: "The Secretary, on the basis of the best scientific evidence available 
and in consultation with the Marine Mammal Commission, is authorized and 
directed . " to determine when... to waive the requirements of this 
section so as to allow taking ... and ... issue permits." ld. 
138. Hayashi, 22 F.3d at 868 (citing 58 Fed. Reg. 41458 (1993». 
139. The doctrine of noscitur a sociis states that if a meaning of a stat-
ute is unclear, "the meaning of doubtful words may be determined by ref-
erence to their relationship with other associated words and phrases." 
SINGER, supra note 52, § 47.16, at 183. 
140. Hayashi, 22 F.3d at 868 (Browning, J., dissenting). 
141. SINGER, supra note 52, § 47.16, at 183. 
142. See supra section V.B. 
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ed that "harassment" is to be "construed sufficiently broadly" 
so that "porpoises [are] given every reasonable protection."I43 
Second, noscitur a sociis may only be used when the clear 
meaning of the word is doubtfuL 144 As the plain meaning of 
"harass" may be found in the dictionary, its meaning is not 
doubtfuL 145 
Thus, as Congress' intent is unambiguous and the mean-
ing of "harass" is not doubtful, the majority incorrectly applied 
the doctrine of noscitur a sociis to determine the meaning of 
"harass" within the MMPA. I46 
The Ninth Circuit's error in employing the doctrine of 
noscitur a sociis is further evidenced by a recent Supreme 
Court decision. 147 Babbitt v. Sweet Home Chapter of Commu-
nities for a Great Oregon 148 involved a dispute over whether 
logging activities that would kill or injure an endangered spe-
cies amounted to "harm" to the species resulting in a "taking" 
under the Endangered Species Act (hereinafter "ESA").149 The 
Supreme Court declined to invalidate the Secretary of the 
Interior's regulation, finding that the Secretary has reasonably 
construed the term "harm" under the ESA. 150 
In considering the lower court's decision, the Supreme 
143. Hayashi, 22 F.3d at 868 (Browning, J., dissenting) (quoting H.R. REp. 
No. 707, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. (1971), reprinted in 1972 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4144, 4150); 
H.R. REP. No. 707, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. (1971), reprinted in 1972 U.S.C.C.A.N. 
4144, 4148. 
144. SINGER, supra, § 47.16, at 183. 
145. See supra note 110 and accompanying text. 
146. Rules of construction are employed to "'illuminate the intent of 
the drafters; when the rule conflicts with other, clearer indications of 
intent, its results should be ignored.'" Hayashi, 22 F.3d at 868 n.3 (Brown-
ing, J., dissenting) (quoting Leslie Salt Co. v. United States, 896 F.2d 354, 
359 (9th Cir. 1990». 
147. Babbit v. Sweet Home Chapter of Communities for Great Oregon, 
115 S. Ct. 2407 (1995). 
148. 115 S.Ct. 2407 (1995). 
149. Kenneth J. Plante et aI., Babbit v. Sweet Home Chapter of Communities 
for a Great Oregon: Preserving the "Critical Link" Between Habitat Modification 
and the "Taking" of an Endangered Species, 20 NOVA L. REV. 747, 776 (1996). 
The ESA defines "take" as "to harass, harm, pursue, hunt, shoot, 
wound, kill, trap, capture, or collect, or attempt to engage in any such 
conduct." 16 U.S.C. § 1532(19) (1994). 
150. Babbit, 115 S. Ct. at 2412. 
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Court held that the Ninth Circuit erred in applying the doc-
trine of noscitur a sociis. 151 The Supreme Court found that by 
employing this doctrine the Ninth Circuit had denied the word 
"harm" its independent meaning. 152 The Court explained 
that, due to its statutory context, Congress meant the term 
"harm" to serve a specific purpose by including it in the 
ESA.153 The Court held that "harm" is distinct from the other 
words used to define "take" and the Ninth Circuit erred by 
employing noscitur a sociis because it essentially gave "harm" 
the same meaning as the other words in the definition. 154 
Just as the Supreme Court in Babbitt held that the doc-
trine of noscitur a sociis was incorrectly applied to determine 
the meaning of "harm" under the ESA,155 the Ninth Circuit 
erred in applying the doctrine to determine the meaning of 
"harass" under the MMPA. 156 In employing such a doctrine, 
the majority looked to the other words that constitute a "take" 
under the MMPA, such as "hunt," "capture," or "kill," without 
giving "harass" its own independent meaning.157 The statuto-
ry context of "harass," as set forth in the MMPA, suggests that 
Congress meant the term to serve a specific function in the 
MMPA.158 Using the Babbitt analysis, the legislative intent 
must be given meaning. 159 Therefore, the majority incorrectly 
applied the doctrine of noscitur a sociis to determine the mean-
ing of "harass" and failed to acknowledge the legislative intent 
behind the MMP A. 
151. [d. at 2415. 
152. [d. 
153. [d. 
154. [d. 
155. [d. 
156. Hayashi, 22 F.3d at 868 (Browning, J., dissenting). 
157. Hayashi, 22 F.3d at 864. The majority declares that because "harass" 
is a "very general term" it is necessary to look to its context to ascertain 
its meaning. [d. The majority then states that since '"words grouped in a 
list should be given related meaning,' we look to the other statutory and 
regulatory examples of 'taking'." [d., (quoting Third Nat'l Bank v. Impac 
Ltd., 432 U.S. 312, 322 (1977)). In deciding that "hunt," "capture," and "kill" 
are words that have a certain level of intrusiveness on marine mammals, 
"[harassment] must entail a silnilar level of direct intrusion." [d. 
158. See supra notes 115-21 and accompanying text for a discussion of 
the legislative intent in including the term "harass" in the MMPA. 
159. Hayashi, 22 F.3d at 868 n.3 (Browning, J., dissenting). 
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F. THE PROPOSED GUIDELINES TO THE MMPA'S 1994 
AMENDMENTS ESTABLISH THAT CONGRESS INTENDED TO 
PROHIBIT THE TYPE OF CONDUCT PERFORMED BY HAYASHI 
In 1994, Congress amended certain prOVlSIOns of the 
MMP A. 160 Specifically, Congress added an amendment to pro-
hibit certain deterrent techniques used by fishermen that have 
a significant adverse impact on marine mammals. 161 Ai:, part 
of the 1994 Amendments, Congress directed the NMFS to 
develop and publish a list of guidelines on how fishermen could 
safely deter marine mammals. 162 The proposed guidelines 
prohibit the use of firearms and other devices that propel inju-
rious projectiles for deterrent purposes, as their use has a 
significant adverse effect on the targeted marine mammals. 163 
Before these proposed guidelines are adopted, they must first 
be submitted to individuals who have experience and knowl-
edge of interactions with marine mammals and the use of 
deterrence devices. 1M However, if approved, the act of 
shooting a firearm where porpoises are swimming as a deter-
rent method would violate the MMP A. 165 These amendments 
160. The Supreme Court has stated that when Congress acts to amend a 
statute, it presumes Congress "intends its amendment to have substantial 
effect." Babbitt v. Sweet Home Chapter of Communities for a Great Ore-
gon, 115 S. Ct. 2407, 2414 (1995) (quoting Stone v. INS, 115 S. Ct. 1537, 1545 
(1995». 
161. 16 U.S.C. § 1371 (a)(4) (1994). 
162. 16 U.S.C. § 1371 (a)(4)(B) (1994); Taking and Importing of Marine Mam-
mals; Deterrence Regulations and Guidelines, 60 Fed. Reg. 22345 (1995). 
163. Taking and Importing of Marine Mammals; Deterrence Regulations 
and Guidelines, 60 Fed. Reg. 22345, 22346 (1995). 
164. [d. Section 101(a)(4) requires that NMFS consults with appropriate 
experts on the implementation of the deterrence provisions. NMFS has 
compiled a list of individuals believed to have experience and knowledge 
of marine mammals and the use of deterrence devices. These individuals 
have been sent a. copy of this proposed rule and asked by NMFS to submit 
commits on this proposed rule. [d. 
165. [d. In discussing the prohibition of firearms for deterrent purposes, 
the NMFS referred to incidents where fishermen used firearms against 
marine mammals. [d. For example, the Alaska Prince William Sound fishery 
used firearms to deter killer whales from damaging its catch and gear. 
Taking of Marine Mammals Incidental to Commercial Fisheries, 59 Fed. Reg. 
45263, 45264 (1994). Three killer whales from the relevant pod were lost 
during 1985, three in 1986, one in 1987 and one in 1988. [d. Furthermore, 
several whales in the pod showed evidence of bullet wounds. [d. The 
deaths of the animals were believed to be the result of intentional takes 
by participants in the fishery. [d. 
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give further support to the contention that Congress intended 
"harass" to be broadly interpreted to encompass violent acts 
such as Hayashi's. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
By narrowly defining what constitutes "harm" under the 
MMPA, the Ninth Circuit ignored the plain meaning of the 
term, the legislative history of the MMPA and the regulations 
interpreting the MMPA. l66 The Ninth Circuit's holding in 
Hayashi allows fishermen to harass marine mammals as long 
as the action does not seriously disrupt normal marine mam-
mal behavior. Based on this holding, fishermen can intention-
ally shoot at mammals to save their catch without any liability 
under the MMPA. One must question whether this is the 
"protection from human activities" that Congress envisioned 
when it enacted the Marine Mammal Protection Act. 
April Fisher" 
Amber A. Belt" 
Additionally, in assessing the frequency of "takes" of marine mam-
mals by fisheries, the Department of Commerce reported that, based on 
congressional guidance, the chasing away of killer whales by fishermen to 
deter the mammals from catch and gear constitutes harassment under the 
MMPA. Taking of Marine Mammals Incidental to Fishing Operations, 59 
Fed. Reg. 43818, 43819 (1994). 
166. See supra part V. 
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